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TOWARDS A HISTORY OF L AW  
AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE 
SU S A N  B A RT I E *  
The purpose of this paper is to argue for more histories of Australian legal scholars that 
study their endeavours through the lens of legal education; in other words, studies which 
situate legal scholars within the context of Australian law schools. I argue that these 
histories could contribute vitally to the history of law as an academic discipline in 
Australia by providing crucial insights into two of the most important developments in 
the history of law, lawyers and legal education: the movement of legal education into 
universities and the significant expansion of university law schools. I suggest that such 
histories could contribute to the basis of rational discussion within the discipline, adding 
to its intellectual core. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N :  A PR E S SI N G  P U Z Z L E 
Within the last 160-odd years two of the most important developments in the 
history of law, lawyers and legal education in common law countries have 
been the movement of legal education into universities and the significant 
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expansion (in terms of student, academic and graduate numbers) of law 
schools within those universities. These changes to legal education had — and 
continue to have — the potential to influence dramatically the nature of 
lawyering, judging, the form and content of laws, the relationship between law 
and society, and the permeation of legal techniques1 into a broad spectrum of 
professional life, public services and private endeavour.2 And yet the intellec-
tual puzzles raised by the changes have not received the attention 
they deserve. 
At the broadest level, the shift to university legal education raises the obvi-
ous question: ‘how did the founders of university legal education frame the 
problem of university legal education and how did they try to solve it?’3 The 
significant expansion of university legal education in the middle of the 
20th century — bringing with it full-time university students, a community of 
full-time legal scholars and an identity (for both graduate and scholar) 
transcending legal practice — requires a slight rephrasing of this question so 
that it becomes: ‘how did a community (as opposed to the small scattering of 
 
 1 As defined and taught by the legal academy. 
 2 ‘As is well known, the formative influence of legal education on later actors in the legal 
process is critically important in shaping any legal system. That is why the history of legal 
education is crucial to an understanding of the development of law generally’: Michael Til-
bury, ‘Marion Dixon, Thirty Up: The Story of the UNSW Law School 1971–2001’ (2002) 
25 University of New South Wales Law Journal 255, 259. Bruce Kercher begins his seminal 
work on the history of Australian law by suggesting that there is a clear connection between 
how law has been taught in Australia, how Australian law is understood and how it has 
developed. He suggests that legal education might, at least partially, explain why in the 20th 
century lawyers failed to recognise the local nature of early Australian law and instead as-
sumed that local law largely accorded with the laws of England: Bruce Kercher, An Unruly 
Child: A History of Law in Australia (Allen & Unwin, 1995) ix. Mark Lunney explores this 
theme further and has argued that ‘we should not be surprised if we find that changes in 
thinking about Australian law can be explained in part by reference to changes in the acade-
my’: Mark Lunney, ‘Legal Émigrés and the Development of Australian Tort Law’ (2012) 36 
Melbourne University Law Review 494, 495. 
 3 By posing this question I am advocating a method favoured by Karl Popper in his studies of 
scientific discovery: 
Among the many methods which [a philosopher] may use — always depending, of 
course, on the problem in hand — one method seems to me worth mentioning. It is a 
variant of the (at present unfashionable) historical method. It consists, simply, in trying to 
find out what other people have thought and said about the problem in hand: why they 
had to face it: how they formulated it: how they tried to solve it. This seems to me im-
portant because it is part of the general method of rational discussion. If we ignore what 
other people are thinking, or have thought in the past, then rational discussion must 
come to an end, though each of us may go on happily talking to himself. 
  Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Taylor & Francis, first published 1959, 2005 ed) 
xx. 
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founders) of legal scholars along with government, the legal profession and 
the university more generally, frame and solve the problem of large-scale 
university legal education?’4 
The underlying normative premise of much that follows in this article is 
that, at least in Australia (the primary focus of this article), we have hardly 
begun to ask — let alone answer — these questions. The ultimate message, 
robbed of all subtlety and nuance, is that we need more studies. While this is a 
value-ridden claim that is based on my impression of existing scholarship, I 
note that I am not alone in making this observation.5 My premise implies that 
there is a way to carry out histories of legal education and that such studies 
either have not been done, or, if they have, they are insufficient in number. I 
am therefore making an implicit criticism of the present scholarly terrain. To 
make good my claim I am therefore obliged to explain what is needed and 
demonstrate why the body of existing histories falls short. 
The phrase ‘legal education’ will be used throughout this paper to refer to 
the phenomena described above: the transplanting of legal education into 
universities, and the endeavour that promoted and sustained the existence of 
law schools. In this sense legal education in Australia is largely synonymous 
with law schools.6 Such endeavour includes teaching, scholarship, administra-
 
 4 As Weisbrot explains: ‘The number of university law students in Australia more than doubled 
between 1950 and 1965 (to 3039), and then trebled between 1965 and 1980 (to 8981)’: David 
Weisbrot, ‘Recent Statistical Trends in Australian Legal Education’ (1991) 2 Legal Education 
Review 219, 222. 
 5 ‘The historical writing which has so far emerged from within Australian legal quarters has, 
with some notable exceptions, largely dismissed legal education as a pre-ordained and unil-
luminating aspect of our local legal history’: Linda Martin, ‘From Apprenticeship to Law 
School: A Social History of Legal Education in Nineteenth Century New South Wales’ (1986) 
9(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 111, 111. Similarly, in America Stevens has 
considered that decisions in law schools have generally been made assuming that ‘the struc-
ture of American legal education dates from time immemorial rather than having been 
forged by the economic and social conditions of the Great Depression’: Robert Stevens, Law 
School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (University of North Carolina 
Press, 1983) 279. In 2001, in England, Duxbury argued that 
[w]e need also studies of the development of legal scholarship and textbook writing more 
generally, of the arguments and normative agenda developed and advanced by legal aca-
demics, of the roles played by these academics, of their objectives and achievements as 
scholars, teachers and legal consultants; in short, we need to delve deeper into the history 
and development of law as an academic discipline in England. Some of this work … has 
already been done. But there is a long way to go yet. 
  Neil Duxbury, Jurists and Judges: An Essay on Influence (Hart Publishing, 2001) 118. Tilbury 
makes a similar point with respect to Australian law schools and scholars: Tilbury, above n 2, 
259. 
 6 It may also include Legal Studies schools such as that at La Trobe University. 
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tive work and any other activity that directly or incidentally shaped, furthered 
or hampered university legal education in Australia. The enterprise of legal 
education is therefore broader and, I would argue, more important than any 
one of these things and certainly must be explained through something more 
than what occurred in the classroom. How legal scholars conceptualised and 
advanced certain fields of study are, as will be argued, a central part of any 
account of the trajectory of legal education. For most of the 20th century, 
Australia did not have research institutes like the Max Planck Institute 
established in Germany in 1911, where law could be studied independently 
from law schools and teaching.7 Unlike the natural sciences, pure research 
into law was not something that supported the place of law within Australian 
universities.8 Instead, the movement of legal education — the education of 
legal practitioners — into universities and the associated growth in full-time 
legal academics is what enabled the growth and professionalisation of legal 
scholarship.9 In Australia the destinies of scholarship and legal scholars both 
explain and can be explained through the context of legal education. 
As argued in the body of this paper, to contribute to these broader histo-
ries scholarly fields ought to be studied through what I describe as the ‘lens of 
legal education’. In other words, they must be studied for what they say about 
the character and identity of legal education at particular points in time. For 
example, were fields advanced to improve the education of the law schools’ 
undergraduate or postgraduate body or to educate members of the legal 
profession or judges? Or were they advanced to enhance the academic 
credentials of legal scholars so that their teaching would be respected and so 
that law would be understood as properly deserving the title ‘academic 
 
 7 While in 1951 a law professor, Geoffrey Sawer, was appointed to the Research School of 
Social Sciences at the Australian National University, he viewed his role as subsidiary to his 
social science colleagues’: Geoffrey Sawer, The Place of a Lawyer in the Social Sciences (Aus-
tralian National University, 1953) 10. Studying law outside of a teaching institution was 
considered an exception and anomaly. 
 8 For an interesting discussion of whether a professionalised legal academy is needed for either 
research or education, see Mathias M Siems, ‘A World without Law Professors’ in Mark 
Van Hoecke (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of 
Discipline? (Hart Publishing, 2011) 71. 
 9 Cosgrove argues that ‘[a]cademic legal culture changed the nature and intent of jurispru-
dence dramatically. This new tradition, in its increasingly professional manifestations, took 
the broad conception of jurisprudence and reduced it to an academic enterprise’: Richard A 
Cosgrove, Scholars of the Law: English Jurisprudence from Blackstone to Hart (New York 
University Press, 1996) 14. See also Finnane’s work on the history of criminology in Austral-
ia. He asks whether criminology existed before the discipline was formed: Mark Finnane, 
‘The Origins of Criminology in Australia’ (2012) 45 Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology 157. 
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discipline’? Conversely, was there little or no relationship between the 
platform of legal education (the institutional context) and how scholars 
thought about their scholarship? If this was the case, on what basis was their 
scholarly endeavour justified? The history of legal education therefore 
includes, but is larger than, the history of the disciplinary practices that 
shaped the discipline of law. It should be added that government, the profes-
sion, other university disciplines and management also play a crucial role in 
explaining the growth, form and continued existence of university  
legal education. 
The purpose of this article is not to provide an exhaustive description of all 
of the work in this area or to provide a definitive template for the field, but to 
explain that something fundamental is missing. I do this by both advancing 
argument and by elucidating examples of existing works that contribute 
partially, and in some cases fundamentally, to the intellectual puzzle of the 
birth and rise of modern legal education. 
II   C O L L E C T I V E  WI S D O M 
One preliminary matter that ought to be considered carefully is the relevance 
of a ‘history’ of Australian legal education written at this point in time. Had 
someone raised the possibility of writing such a history in the 1950s or 1960s, 
when for the first time Australian law schools began employing greater 
numbers of full-time legal academics to supplement the existing skeletal 
staff,10 their colleagues would have found the notion absurd. Perhaps there 
would have been something to say about the first Professors of Law which 
would have been relevant to the creation and establishment of the legal 
academy during its formative period,11 but as there was so little legal scholar-
 
 10 See Susan Bartie, ‘A Full Day’s Work: A Study of Australia’s First Legal Scholarly Community’ 
(2010) 29 University of Queensland Law Journal 67. 
 11 I am not suggesting here that there was little interest in the history of legal education at this 
time, simply that compiling such histories was not a priority. Short histories of law schools 
were written: see, eg, Robin L Sharwood, ‘A Short History of the Law School’ in The Universi-
ty of Melbourne, Faculty of Law Handbook, 1963 (1963); Sir Thomas Bavin (ed), The Jubilee 
Book of the Law School of the University of Sydney 1890–1940 (Halstead Press, 1940) (which 
mentions the first Challis Professor of Law, Pitt Cobbett). One might also speculate that 
members of this first community of legal academics were aware of larger historical works 
conducted elsewhere, such as F H Lawson, The Oxford Law School 1850–1965 (Clarendon 
Press, 1968). Some biographical works were published on judges who had been instrumental 
in the development of some law schools as well as the form and content of the law schools’ 
early curricula: see, eg, A J Hannan, The Life of Chief Justice Way: A Biography of the Right 
Honourable Sir Samuel Way, Bart, PC, DCL, LLD, for Many Years Lieutenant-Governor and 
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ship, so few teaching materials, and so many students were flooding the law 
schools, writing a history of legal education would have been looked upon by 
this first real community of Australian legal scholars as an esoteric indul-
gence. It would be seen as froth and bubble when what was needed was beer. 
Further, the first community of full-time legal scholars were so few in 
number that they generally knew one another and several had connections to 
the old order: the skeletal staff of late 19th and early 20th century university 
legal education.12 The creation and furtherance of Australian legal education 
was the hot topic of conversation for this new generation, which meant that 
there was a shared knowledge and understanding of what had gone before as 
well as what needed to be done to fulfill their high ambitions for Australian 
legal education.13 In most respects they were a ‘community’ in the true sense 
 
Chief Justice of South Australia, and Chancellor of the University of Adelaide (Angus and 
Robertson, 1960), the biography of Sir Samuel Way who was Vice-Chancellor and then 
Chancellor at The University of Adelaide. Some of the first professors, such as the founding 
Professor of Law at The University of Western Australia, Frank Beasley, were mentioned in 
larger histories of the University: see Fred Alexander, Campus at Crawley: A Narrative and 
Critical Appreciation of the First Fifty Years of the University of Western Australia (F W Chesh-
ire, 1963) 119. Several historical accounts had also been given of the first Dean of Law at The 
University of Melbourne, William Hearn: Douglas B Copland, W E Hearn: First Australian 
Economist (Melbourne University Press, 1935); J A La Nauze, Political Economy in Australia: 
Historical Studies (Melbourne University Press, 1949); Geoffrey Blainey, A Centenary History 
of The University of Melbourne (Melbourne University Press, 1957). 
 12 For example, at The University of Melbourne members of the first community of legal 
scholars, David Derham, Zelman Cowen and Geoffrey Sawer, had each been educated by the 
handful of law professors who taught in the Faculty of Law prior to 1950. Geoffrey Sawer had 
taught alongside the old order and there is clear evidence that he thought about one of his 
predecessors at Melbourne, Professor William Hearn: Sawer, The Place of a Lawyer, 
above n 7, 10–11. At The University of Sydney Kenneth Shatwell, who served as Dean of the 
Faculty of Law from 1947 to 1973, had been the Dean of Law at the University of Tasmania in 
the 1930s and so was familiar with the system of university legal education prior to the Sec-
ond World War: see Richard Davis, 100 Years: A Centenary History of the Faculty of Law, 
University of Tasmania 1893–1993 (University of Tasmania, 1993) 27–31. The University of 
Tasmania makes for an interesting study and contrast as there was a considerable turnover of 
staff in the 1950s that appears to be, at least in part, due to attitudes towards the University’s 
handling of the Orr case, which concerned allegations made that a professor had seduced and 
taken advantage of a student. As the handling of the dispute made it difficult to attract aca-
demics from Australia to the University, members of the Faculty of Law were recruited from 
overseas: at 46–52. For further discussion of the Orr case, see W H C Eddy, Orr (Jacaranda 
Publishers, 1961). 
 13 The establishment of the Australian Universities Law Schools Association in the late 1940s, 
with its annual conference, helped with the dissemination of information amongst the 
full-time staff of Australian law schools. The annual conference was an important event in a 
legal scholar’s academic calendar, with each school sending delegates. Much of the agenda 
was occupied with matters concerning the teaching of law (this can be readily appreciated 
from a review of the early minutes of the conference). 
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of the word.14 A history of the old order would have no doubt thrown up 
some new insights but it would have traversed much familiar ground. There 
were more important things to research and explore, things of a more pressing 
nature that they knew much less about. 
Can the same be said of Australian legal scholars today? Can we identify a 
community who share common wisdom about the problems associated with 
legal education and share beliefs on how to solve them? Perhaps there is in 
some sense a community but its shape and form is very different — fractured, 
specialised, several small frogs in a much larger pond. Discussions about legal 
education seem removed from the pioneering spirit that motivated the first 
community of legal academics and the searching questions about the role of 
university legal education that sat squarely in the minds of those pioneers. 
Several models of university legal education exist and often seem entrenched, 
altered only in response (strategically or otherwise) to government or 
bureaucratic trends, making it seem as though there is little to pioneer. 
Further, there is a perception that the context of university legal education — 
with managers and government imposing measures of accountability and 
driving up student numbers — serves to curb intellectual independence and 
creativity.15 Within the contemporary academy there are those legal scholars 
who define themselves by (amongst other things) their interest in certain 
aspects of legal education (writing and delivering papers on legal scholarship 
and teaching, applying for teaching grants and prizes, and putting themselves 
forward for roles in curriculum design) and those who do not. Adverse 
judgments are sometimes made by one group about the other. 
It is important to recognise that treating sustained inquiries into legal 
education as a specialty is a new phenomenon and, I would argue, an unfor-
tunate one. One does not need to search very hard to find evidence of the 
majority of members of the first community of legal scholars, including its 
best and brightest, engaging in serious and searching scholarly investigation 
into the role of law schools, how best to advance university legal education, 
 
 14 Which is not to suggest that there was not any friction within that community. 
 15 There is much writing on neoliberalism, managerialism and the contraction of the critical 
voice within universities and law schools: see, eg, Margaret Thornton, Privatising the Public 
University: The Case of Law (Routledge, 2012); Stuart Macintyre, ‘Universities’ in Clive Ham-
ilton and Sarah Maddison (eds), Silencing Dissent: How the Australian Government Is Control-
ling Public Opinion and Stifling Debate (Allen & Unwin, 2007) 41; Matthew Ball, ‘Legal Edu-
cation and the “Idealistic Student”: Using Foucault to Unpack the Critical Legal Narrative’ 
(2010) 36(2) Monash University Law Review 80, 85–90. 
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and how and what should be studied, published and taught.16 Leaders in the 
second wave of law schools — the new schools that emerged in the 1960s and 
1970s17 — also made it a matter of considerable importance.18 The fact that 
earlier generations treated legal education as a matter of serious scholarly 
inquiry and that there exists a long tradition of thought on legal education 
involving most members of faculty seems to have gone largely unacknowl-
edged. Instead there has grown up a bizarre folk law, sparked and engendered 
by the much maligned yet still relied upon Australian Law Schools: A Disci-
pline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 
(‘Pearce Report’),19 that rigorous, introspective and reflective teaching, 
scholarly and disciplinary practices are something new, something which 
emerged in the 1990s. The fact that those who carried out this assessment of 
Australian law schools could not find a neatly packaged explanation of law 
 
 16 See above n 12. There are references to scholarship on legal education authored by members 
of the first community of Australian legal scholars peppered throughout this paper. 
 17 The law schools created in this second wave were at Monash University, The University of 
New South Wales (‘UNSW’), Macquarie University, Queensland Institute of Technology 
(now Queensland University of Technology) and New South Wales Institute of Technology 
(now University of Technology, Sydney). A legal studies school was also created at La Trobe. 
See also Part VI(B) below. 
 18 For example Professor David Derham, the founding Dean of the Faculty of Law at Monash 
University, wrote a large body of scholarship on legal education: see Philip Ayres (ed), David 
Derham: Talks on Universities, History and the Law (Oryx Publishing, 2009). See also Peter 
Yule and Fay Woodhouse, Pericleans, Plumbers and Practitioners: The First Fifty Years of the 
Monash Law School (Monash University Publishing, 2014) ch 2. The founding academics at 
the Law School at UNSW are also reported to have engaged in searching inquiry into the 
nature and form of legal education: see Brian Kelsey, ‘“What’s Wrong with the Law School?”’ 
in Critique of Law Editorial Collective (ed), Critique of Law: A Marxist Perspective (UNSW 
Critique of Law Society, 1978) 124; Gill H Boehringer, ‘Introduction’ (1988–89) 5 Australian 
Journal of Law and Society 53, 55; Marion Dixon, ‘Thirty Up’ — The Story of UNSW Law 
School, 1971–2001 (UNSW Law School, 2001) 4–9. For a recent account of the beginnings of 
the UNSW Law School, see Frank Carrigan, ‘They Make a Desert and Call It Peace’ (2014) 
23 Legal Education Review 313, 318–21. Carrigan’s article also provides a frank account of 
the range of educational objectives of the Law School at Macquarie University and the oppo-
sition faced by the critical legal scholars: at 324–34. The fifth volume of Macquarie’s Australi-
an Journal of Law and Society was devoted entirely to matters of legal education. 
 19 Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline 
Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1987) vol 1. While the Pearce Report provoked numerous published 
criticisms in newspapers and journals by Australian legal academics who wrote on behalf of 
both their institutions and all Australian law schools, a balanced critical analysis was con-
ducted by academics who were not located in Australian law schools and therefore had no 
vested interest in the report: see Craig McInnis, Simon Marginson and Alison Morris, Aus-
tralian Law Schools after the 1987 Pearce Report (Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1994). They identified several major flaws in both the report’s methodology and its findings. 
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school and disciplinary practices20 led to their recommendation that more 
scholarship on the topic was needed and their support for the creation of a 
specialised legal education journal.21 These comments wrongly gave rise to the 
view that earlier generations of legal scholars thought little about such 
things.22 It has enabled a new band of specialist legal educators to suggest that 
they are the only pioneers. This belittles the thought, energy and excitement 
that was injected into legal education in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Of course 
new ideas have emerged and some old practices have been found wanting, but 
such an observation does not and should not imply that earlier generations of 
legal scholars did not think long and hard about legal education. In fact even 
meagre inquiries will reveal that the reality is quite the opposite.23 Many 
 
 20 Pearce, Campbell and Harding, above n 19, lxii. 
 21 Ibid lxi. 
 22 Attitudes of prominent law graduates of The University of Sydney in the 1960s may have also 
contributed to this view. For example, Michael Kirby has reported on the unimaginative 
narrowness of his legal education at Sydney, save for the Jurisprudence class: Michael Kirby, 
‘The Graduating Class of Sydney Law School 1962: Talented, Lucky, Unquestioning’ (2012) 
36 Australian Bar Review 189, 196, 199–200. Given that from what is known it is apparent 
that Australian law schools in different states had different histories, reports on one law 
school ought not to be used as a proxy for all. 
 23 Some have wrongly suggested that this earlier generation taught doctrine in a narrow, 
positivist and uncritical fashion, following the traditions of their predecessors: see, eg, Mi-
chael Chesterman and David Weisbrot, ‘Legal Scholarship in Australia’ (1987) 50 Modern 
Law Review 709, 710; John Gava, ‘Introductory Essay’ (1988–89) 5 Australian Journal of Law 
and Society 1, 3; Nickolas James, ‘Power-Knowledge in Australian Legal Education: Corpo-
ratism’s Reign’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 587, 596; Margaret Thornton, ‘The Dissolution 
of the Social in the Legal Academy’ (2006) 25 Australian Feminist Law Journal 3, 15; Carri-
gan, above n 18, 315–16, citing Margaret Thornton, ‘Portia Lost in the Groves of Academe 
Wondering What to Do about Legal Education’ (1991) 34(2) Australian Universities’ Review 
26. Without further elaboration it is difficult to know what exactly is meant by these opaque 
value-ridden descriptions. However, if it is suggested that these scholars were not innovative 
or aware of approaches to teaching law beyond Austinian positivism, several histories of 
individual scholars and law schools, as well as my own investigations, suggest quite the oppo-
site: see Bartie, ‘A Full Day’s Work’, above n 10. Lunney has also suggested that this character-
isation ‘may be too harsh’: see Lunney, ‘Legal Émigrés and the Development of Australian 
Tort Law’, above n 2, 498. It also does not marry with the number and content of the many 
tributes dedicated to members of our first community of legal scholars: see, eg, Ross 
Cranston, ‘“Lawyer in the Social Sciences” — Geoffrey Sawer’ (1980) 11 Federal Law Review 
263; Mark Lunney, ‘Fleming’s Law of Tort: Australian-Made or Foreign Import? Australia’s 
Role in Making the “King” of Torts’ (2013) 36 Australian Bar Review 211; Ian Ramsay,  
‘Professor Harold Ford and the Development of Australian Corporate Law’ (2011) 29 Com-
pany and Securities Law Journal 30; Justice Michael Kirby, ‘People in Criminal Law: Louis  
Waller AO’ (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 215; Helen Irving, Jacqueline Mowbray and 
Kevin Walton (eds), Julius Stone: A Study in Influence (Federation Press, 2010); Guenther 
Doeker-Mach and Klaus A Ziegert (eds), Alice Erh Soon Tay: Lawyer, Scholar, Civil Servant 
(Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004); Geoffrey Lindell, ‘Leslie Zines — From a Personal Perspective’ 
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predecessors made the form and content of legal education, and its reasons for 
existence, their primary occupation. 
The relatively recent development (emerging in the 1990s) of treating legal 
education as a form of specialty and the temptation to ignore the thoughts of 
earlier generations is unfortunate for many reasons but I will highlight just 
two. First, it leads to a segregation of knowledge and public debate about legal 
education where the views of some of the most important legal scholars are 
left out (mostly of their own volition). Second, it has meant that this body of 
scholarly endeavour has largely been divorced from what could have formed 
its intellectual core. There is no sense of building or responding to previous 
thought and reflection but instead we are presented with what are largely 
reactions to loose impressions. By ignoring what others have thought about 
the problems of legal education in the past we weaken — and perhaps even 
remove — the possibility for rational discussion today.24 
Rather than froth and bubble, the present situation suggests that there is a 
real need for histories that allow for proper reflection on the entirety of 
20th century endeavour that help to explain the phenomenon of Australian 
legal education. In this highly specialised — one might even say alienating — 
environment, there is a very real risk that in the absence of historical studies 
legal scholars will form their impressions of the opportunities, choices and 
models available to legal educators solely from the limited pool of specialised 
scholarship and mentors they are ‘fortuitously’, ‘accidentally’ or ‘unfortunate-
ly’ introduced to in their formative years. This has the very real potential of 
shutting down rather than opening up thinking about legal education. 
This state of affairs also brings with it the very real risk that scholars will 
lose sight of the central questions that any discipline ought to face and were 
once at the apex of thinking about legal education: why does it exist and what 
should it do? These questions seem vitally important in an environment 
where large numbers of graduates are struggling to find employment and 
lengthy criticisms are made of the expansion of law schools and the job 
 
(2010) 38 Federal Law Review 317; Malcolm Smith, ‘Comparative Law and Legal Culture: A 
Tribute to David Allan and Mary Hiscock’ (2003) 15(2) Bond Law Review 20; Annesley 
Athaide, ‘Alex Castles on the Recognition of Australian Legal History 1955–1963’ (2003) 7 
Australian Journal of Legal History 107. A recent symposium was also held at The University 
of Melbourne, 26–27 March 2014, dedicated to the Law School’s former distinguished Dean, 
Sir Zelman Cowen. Some of the papers presented at the symposium will be published in issue 
38(3) of the Melbourne University Law Review. 
 24 See Popper, above n 3, xx. 
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prospects of legal academics, suggesting that both are self-serving.25 If legal 
scholars do not know how these questions were addressed at either the time 
that law schools or the legal academy were founded, how can we begin to 
answer them today? While precedent is a fundamental tool of reasoning in 
law, it has rarely been used in discussions of legal education in part because 
there is so little knowledge about these earlier periods; the primary materials 
have not been explored and interrogated. 
Not only does the present legal academy need studies of the history of legal 
education, there are also factors that suggest that conditions are favourable for 
such histories. All histories are influenced by the context in which they are 
written as well as by the views of the historian who writes them. For example, 
Shreve believed that Stevens’ critical history of the American law school26 was 
overly pessimistic about the state of legal education and judged it by too harsh 
a standard because ‘[a]ny appraisal of legal education’s role and future made in 
1970 is likely to be jaundiced by the despair that then pervaded law schools 
and the country as a whole’.27 A similar view could be taken of John Henry 
Schlegel’s history of American empirical legal scholars.28 Published in 1995, it 
is clear that Schlegel lamented the fact that empirical studies had failed to grab 
a solid hold of the legal academy. The perspective and profile of the scholar 
conducting the study as well as the openness of the current generation of legal 
scholars to challenging some of the pillars on which law schools are perceived 
to stand must therefore be borne in mind. In Australia in the 1970s a large 
body of students emerged who were sympathetic towards elements of Marxist 
doctrine and critical of their professors’ views on both the scope of law and 
the law’s potential for social change.29 If a student who emerged during this 
decade were inclined to write a history of legal education then one would 
expect that their teachers and predecessors would be portrayed in largely 
unsympathetic terms. While similar concerns and frustrations about the 
characterisation of teaching law can be found among the legal academy today, 
in the past 20 years increased variety and plurality in both scholarship and 
 
 25 For a particularly damning account of the self-serving nature of American law schools, see 
Brian Z Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
 26 See Stevens, above n 5. 
 27 Gene R Shreve, ‘History of Legal Education’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 597, 604. 
 28 See John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (University of 
North Carolina Press, 1995). 
 29 Geoffrey Sawer, ‘Who Controls the Law in Australia?: Instigators of Change, and the 
Obstacles Confronting Them’ in David Hambly and John Goldring (eds), Australian Lawyers 
and Social Change (Law Book, 1976) 118, 121–2. 
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(to some but a lesser extent) teaching30 has created an environment where 
legal scholars seeking change are less likely to believe that bold condemnation 
of prior practices is the only way to make room for a new orthodoxy. In this 
environment there is a greater likelihood that past practices will be explored 
with an attitude of balanced maturity and will be judged on their own terms 
rather than against present attitudes.31 In other words, the past won’t be 
ploughed and dismissed merely as part of an argument for present change. 
III   L AW  A S  A N  A C A D E M I C  DI S C I P L I N E 
A robust, critical, historical and sociological study of the origins of university 
legal education — probing what was created, how and why it endured and 
prospered — is the critical first step towards a proper understanding of the 
nature of legal education today. Without knowing what, how and why 
university legal education was created in the first place and then understand-
ing how and why it grew, we cannot understand what it has become. And, as 
several have argued, we cannot understand what law — in the broader 
sense — has become.32 
In this Part, my point is to suggest that the endeavours of legal scholars are 
essential to any explanation of the birth and rise of legal education. An 
important question to explore in any history of university legal education is 
the extent to which, and how, law became an ‘academic’ discipline.33 What is it 
that distinguishes law at university from the practice of law and the teaching 
of law in practice?34 What distinguishes it from other disciplines? What has it 
borrowed from other disciplines and practice and what has it reacted against? 
And, more broadly, what does this say about, or how has it altered, the pursuit 
 
 30 See Mary Keyes and Richard Johnstone, ‘Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality and 
Prospects for the Future’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 537. 
 31 See Susan Bartie, ‘The Lingering Core of Legal Scholarship’ (2010) 30 Legal Studies 345,  
353–4. 
 32 See above n 2. 
 33 The term ‘academic’ is used here to refer to a form of teaching and studying law that can be 
contrasted with the learning of law within professional practice. The term is not used to make 
an evaluation of whether the teaching and study of law ought to be described as ‘academic’. A 
penetrating analysis of what it means to be an academic or an intellectual and whether legal 
scholars deserve such a title is beyond the scope of this paper. For an interesting exploration 
of the topic, see Stefan Collini, Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 
 34 Indeed, there may be little that distinguishes the two, suggesting that the teaching of law at 
university did little to build or enhance its academic credentials. 
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of legal education? Presumably law could only become academic either 
through the endeavours of academics that were not full-time legal practition-
ers or through the efforts of legal practitioners who believed that the teaching 
of law should be conducted in a manner distinctive from practice. Histories of 
legal education that concentrate on legal scholars therefore have the greatest 
potential to yield insights into the history of law as an academic discipline. 
They are a special type and subset of histories of the broader topic: legal 
education. They reveal the intellectual framing and answering of the puzzles 
outlined at the beginning of this paper.35 To describe the intellectual framing 
of legal education it is necessary to interrogate the relationship between 
academic endeavour and the context of Australian legal education. It cannot 
be assumed that the context of legal education and law schools will influence 
the endeavour or that the endeavour is always a product of its context.36 
The remainder of this paper focuses on this important subset of histories 
of legal education on the basis that this subset is both one of the most 
important pieces of the puzzle and one that so far has suffered the greatest 
neglect. Most histories or sociological accounts of legal education either focus 
on institutions or broader trends. Biographies or tributes to scholars often rip 
the scholar from the context of legal education. Many jurisprudential works 
treat academic contributions as floating ideas sitting independently from the 
context of legal education. My point is to argue for studies that focus on or 
incorporate close investigation of scholarly endeavour so that the ‘academic’ 
side of legal education — the relationship between scholarly endeavour and 
the trajectory of legal education — can be properly acknowledged and 
incorporated into the history of Australian legal education.37 
 
 35 Lunney speaks of how the ideas of Wolfgang Friedmann at The University of Melbourne and 
John Fleming at the University of Canberra marked a change in the intellectualisation of 
Australian law schools: Lunney, ‘Legal Émigrés and the Development of Australian Tort Law’, 
above n 2. 
 36 For a similar argument, see Brian Leiter, ‘Is There an “American” Jurisprudence?’ (1997) 17 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 367. Recently Lunney argued that 
although certain structural features of the Australian legal academy in general, and of 
Canberra University College in particular, provided a propitious environment for [Flem-
ing’s textbook on the law of tort] to be written, the content of the textbook owes little to 
anything Australian. 
  Lunney, ‘Fleming’s Law of Tort’, above n 23, 211. Fleming’s work may say something about 
what was possible within an Australian law school and speak of ambitions within such 
schools but may not say anything about the existence or emergence of a particular kind of 
‘Australian’ intellectual tradition. 
 37 In the spirit of Horwitz I am trying to ‘bridge the chasm between legal theory and legal 
history’: Morton J Horwitz, ‘History and Theory’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1825, 1835. 
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It does not necessarily follow from this that the investigation of scholarly 
endeavour will show that legal academics were integral to the colonisation of 
legal education by universities. It may be that scholars in fact had relatively 
little influence and that the founding and expansion of academic law can be 
divorced entirely from the ideas of legal scholars, and the way they shaped the 
curriculum and founded scholarly practices; that is, that it was not accompa-
nied by legal ideas. While it would be ironic indeed that law could become 
‘academic’ (in the sense of being placed in the hands of full-time professional 
law teachers) without — or with little — assistance from ‘academics’, it is 
nonetheless possible. However, if this is the case it ought to be proved rather 
than merely asserted and such proof must, as a minimum, involve exploring 
intellectual endeavour to search for connections and influence. 
I also hold serious concerns about sociological theorising that treats aca-
demics in a similar way to how Marxists have treated the proletariat — as 
mere pawns to be directed by government, university administration and the 
profession. In other words, I am sceptical of theorising that treats academics 
as mere victims of circumstance.38 While the bureaucratisation of universities 
is a very real phenomenon, its effects on academics and whether, how and 
when it robbed them of discretion and autonomy can only be known after a 
careful study of those academics.39 
In contrast to some of the sociological and institutional studies, some ex-
isting literature supports the idea that a legal scholar’s involvement in the 
founding of legal education, and the ideas they embraced and pursued, may 
be crucial to any explanation of the trajectory of the discipline. Take, for 
example, Linda Martin’s trailblazing social history of legal education in 
19th century New South Wales.40 Prior to Martin’s study it was believed that 
the decision to introduce legal studies into The University of Sydney’s curricu-
 
 38 A theme in Judith Lancaster, The Modernisation of Legal Education: A Critique of the Martin, 
Bowen and Pearce Reports (Centre for Legal Education, 1993). 
 39 Duxbury, for example, argues that ideas in jurisprudence in England have very much been 
isolated from larger movements: 
The links between jurisprudence and society in England are fewer and generally more 
tenuous than those which can be established on this side of the Atlantic. While, for ex-
ample, it seems very difficult to determine the influence of the creation of the welfare 
state on English jurisprudential thought, the picture is very different when we consider, 
say, the similarities between New Deal and realist legal outlooks or the influence of events 
of the 1960s on the emergence of critical legal studies. 
  Neil Duxbury, ‘When Trying Is Failing: Holmes’s “Englishness”’ (1997) 63 Brooklyn Law 
Review 145, 146 (citations omitted). 
 40 See Martin, above n 5. 
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lum was never questioned. In stark contrast to this traditional belief, Martin 
demonstrated that although practising lawyers played a crucial role in the 
founding of The University of Sydney they, along with the first teachers in law, 
were reluctant to include law within the University’s curriculum.41 Lawyers 
believed that only law in its general and classical sense was an academic 
subject of study.42 When eventually the Vice-Chancellor proclaimed that the 
time had come to include law within the University he was criticised for his 
vulgar resort to ‘utility’ in legal education.43 Martin suggests that the move-
ment of legal education into the University was not delayed by lack of 
funding, but by a pervasive belief that there was little value in practical 
university legal studies.44 
According to Martin’s history, John Fletcher Hargrave, Solicitor-General 
and member of the Legislative Council, gave the first lectures in law at Sydney 
in 1859. His views on and approach to teaching were instrumental in the 
initial failure of law at Sydney to gain traction: 
In the preface to the first of his books, Hargrave describes his initial endeavour 
as one to make law ‘Popular, Accessible, Intelligible and Interesting’ to his ‘fel-
low colonists of New South Wales’. His lectures spanned a wide range of sub-
jects, including Constitutional Law, the Judicial and Legal System, the Nature of 
the Common Law, Real and Personal Property, and Commercial Law. The in-
troductory lectures were, however, specifically directed to the study of Juris-
prudence or ‘abstract law’ as ‘a high and noble science’, referring to the works of 
Burke, Blackstone, Bacon and others. 
One of the lectures was prefaced by a quote from Bolingbroke remarking on 
a perceived decline in legal standards and exhorting lawyers to take a liberal 
education. Where once there had been lawyers who were ‘Orators, Philoso-
phers, Historians’, the passage read, the profession had lately fallen prey to 
greed and avarice. Lawyers could only escape this fate 
by climbing up the ‘vantage ground’ of science … instead of grovelling all 
their lives below in a mean but gainful appreciation of all the little arts of 
chicane. Till this happen, the profession of the law will scarce deserve to be 
marked among the learned professions.45 
 
 41 Ibid 121–2. 
 42 Ibid. 
 43 Ibid 132. 
 44 Ibid 141–3. 
 45 Ibid 122 (citations omitted). 
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Lacking a clear link to the day-to-day practices of law and given that 
‘[u]niversity education at the end of the nineteenth century was hardly a 
popular pastime’,46 Hargrave’s lectures stunted rather than promoted the 
growth of legal education at Sydney. Legal education only began in earnest at 
the initiation of the Vice-Chancellor and Martin’s work suggests that there 
would have been even greater delays were it not for an external push for the 
amalgamation of barristers and solicitors in accordance with common 
standards and pressure for The University of Sydney to keep up with 
The University of Melbourne, which had established a law school several 
decades before.47 
Within the next major phase in university legal education we find similar 
evidence to suggest that the growth and form of legal education should be 
understood through both academic and non-academic actors. Take, for 
example, developments at The University of Melbourne prior to the Second 
World War. There the two law professors, Bailey and Paton, were both 
committed to instilling law graduates with a broad, liberal education and had 
an ‘aversion to technical professional training’.48 They pushed for a broad 
academic education that was ‘more jurisprudential, less professional and 
vocational, and directed more towards the social and theoretical context of 
law’.49 Their adversaries included members of the Law Institute of Victoria, 
who wished to increase the articled clerks course as well as the number of 
‘practical’ subjects (such as taxation and trust accounts) taught within the 
University.50 This led to a long-running battle which demonstrated both that 
the law teachers did not possess full autonomy over the running of the law 
school, and that the law professors were able combatants. The professors 
managed to stave off some of the proposals and were even successful in using 
some of the Institute’s arguments and demands strategically — to increase the 
size of the law school (they said they needed another professor) as well as the 
length of the law degree.51 
Accounts like these suggest that to understand the history of law as an 
academic discipline it is necessary to study the way that legal academics 
interacted with the profession, government and the broader university and to 
 
 46 Ibid 142. 
 47 Ibid. 
 48 John Waugh, First Principles: The Melbourne Law School 1857–2007 (Miegunyah Press, 2007) 
112. Exactly what this means and what it entails warrants further exploration. 
 49 Ibid. 
 50 Ibid 116–19. 
 51 Ibid 124–5. 
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identify the initiatives they devised and attempted to inject into the curricu-
lum. The intellectual commitments and ambitions of legal scholars and what 
happened to those commitments and ambitions form an important part of the 
history of law and more particularly the history of law as an academic 
discipline. Knowing what was the product of academic drive and what was the 
result of compromise or external dictates is important to any understanding, 
not to mention any evaluation, of academic law. 
IV  T H E  LE N S  O F  LE G A L  ED U C AT I O N 
Of course legal scholarship is already replete with literature on thinkers in law. 
Careful and detailed study has been devoted to influential scholars in works of 
jurisprudence, legal theory, biography, intellectual history and festschrift. 
While the prospect of making sense of past legal thinkers has always held the 
interest of theoretically inclined and reflective legal scholars, the vast increase 
in scholarship and schools of thought in law, enabled by the creation of a legal 
academy, has encouraged an even greater volume of studies. It seems wise to 
make sense of what has become a great tangle of ideas before adding another 
thread. With so much ink already spilt, what work could more exploratory 
studies of thinkers do to shed light on the trajectory of legal education? A 
further argument of this paper is that works devoted to legal thinkers are 
rarely executed in a way that promotes the fullest elucidation of the intellectu-
al puzzles concerning legal education. Typical reasons for studying the work 
and life of a legal scholar include exploring how they advanced a particular 
field of disciplinary discourse,52 reclaiming or reinterpreting their jurispru-
dence so that it excites renewed attention or garners attention it originally 
deserved but has not obtained,53 or giving general appreciation for them and 
their work.54 
 
 52 The examples are too numerous to set down a full selection here. By way of example, see 
H L A Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Clarendon 
Press, 1982); G Edward White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1980); Michael Taggart, ‘Prolegomenon to an Intellectual History of Administra-
tive Law in the Twentieth Century: The Case of John Willis and Canadian Administrative 
Law’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 223. 
 53 For a recent example, see Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of 
Lon L Fuller (Hart Publishing, 2012). See also William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist 
Movement (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973). 
 54 For a recent example, see Martin Krygier, Philip Selznick: Ideals in the World (Stanford Law 
Books, 2012). 
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While these are all worthwhile aims, supported across a range of disci-
plines in which studies of intellectuals can be found, they are not always 
compatible with the task of finding answers to the problem of university legal 
education. Here and in the next Part I argue: first, that a thinker’s role in the 
trajectory of legal education can only be fully understood by studying scholars 
through the lens of legal education; and second, that taking this perspective 
can reveal fundamental insights into the scholar’s endeavour that might be 
integral to any understanding of that scholar, no matter what the primary aim 
of the study may be. 
To advance these arguments I should first explain what I mean by studying 
a scholar ‘through the lens of legal education’. The type of study I have in 
mind is one that treats the contributions and endeavours of a legal scholar — 
the course of their scholarly career — as a form of evidence of how they, 
consciously or not, faced the challenge of either creating university legal 
education or furthering large-scale university legal education in their scholar-
ship, in their teaching and in the administration of the law schools and 
research centres in which they worked.55 While there may be some excep-
tions, it seems reasonable to assume that scholars who carved out their careers 
during one of the formative stages of Australian university education largely 
chose to conduct work that they believed was both important and necessary 
for the creation and furtherance of this enterprise. Their endeavours can 
therefore be treated as evidence of the role for Australian legal scholars they 
favoured as well as being indicative of the aspirations they held for both 
themselves and the academy. Their endeavours speak of the professional 
identity they sought, and tried to obtain, to move Australian legal education 
along one path rather than another. 
Of course their careers may not have embodied all of their aspirations. 
Their ability to model the professional identity they favoured may have been 
limited for a number of reasons. For example, they may not have been able to 
realise their ambitions due to fiscal, political, practical, intellectual, personal 
or institutional concerns. The cooperation (or lack thereof) of colleagues and 
others and their own personality, intellect and drive are all factors which 
suggest that merely using their career as evidence of their preferences for the 
legal academy has its shortcomings. Any explanation of their contribution 
must therefore acknowledge these limitations and attempt to explain both a 
scholar’s aspirations as well as how their career may have fallen short of their 
 
 55 Two good American examples or models of the kind of study I have in mind are Laura 
Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927–1960 (University of North Carolina Press, 1986);  
Schlegel, American Legal Realism, above n 28. 
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ideal. In the type of study contemplated here, a scholar’s endeavours should be 
examined to tell us what these say about the scholar’s perception and ambi-
tions for legal education rather than for working out how they advanced a 
particular field. What their contributions add to a field of study or to an 
understanding or advancement in law is only indirectly relevant. It may help 
explain what their contribution meant for legal education — in particular 
legal scholars and the legal academy — and whether it raised the profile of 
legal education or confidence in the enterprise, but it should not be prioritised 
at the expense of their broader endeavour or divorced from its broader 
context. 
Explicit comments made by the scholar about their ambitions for them-
selves, law schools and the legal academy can be tested against their endeav-
ours: to what extent did their career embody their aspirations? Were they 
advocating a model that suited them best or one which sought a goal they 
believed necessary for the legal academy? The gap between aspiration and 
reality may tell us something about the environment of legal education or the 
characteristics of the scholar. It is important that their published views are not 
taken as a substitute for a careful investigation of their endeavours. While 
some may preach what they practise, this is something that ought to be tested. 
Their published views may also contain an aspirational element of what a legal 
scholar should do. As I have argued in another context, we ought to be wary of 
legal meta-analysis that dresses up frustrations and lobbying as fact.56 
Therefore we must scrutinise scholarly endeavour alongside aspirations to 
capture a scholar’s contributions and what it was they were attempting to do. 
What I am suggesting will, of course, amount to an arduous task. It re-
quires a careful reading of a scholar’s work, an exploration of their teaching 
practices and a study of the broader context of the university. It may also 
require a partial biography, searching for an explanation of the scholar’s 
endeavours from what can be found out about their personal background. In 
this I not only agree with John Henry Schlegel that the intellectual history 
project should be abandoned and replaced instead with histories of intellectu-
als,57 but add that this is the best way that learning about the contribution of 
 
 56 Susan Bartie, ‘The Impact of Legal Meta-Scholarship: Love Thy Navel’ (2009) 18 Griffith Law 
Review 727, 743. 
 57 See, eg, John Henry Schlegel, ‘Langdell’s Legacy: Or, the Case of the Empty Envelope’ (1984) 
36 Stanford Law Review 1517; John Henry Schlegel, ‘The Ten Thousand Dollar Question’ 
(1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 435; John Henry Schlegel, ‘Talkin’ Dirty: Twining’s Tower and 
Kalman’s Strange Career’ (1996) 21 Law & Social Inquiry 981; John Henry Schlegel, ‘Does 
Duncan Kennedy Wear Briefs or Boxers? Does Richard Posner Ever Sleep? Writing about 
Jurisprudence, High Culture and the History of Intellectuals’ (1997) 45 Buffalo Law Review 
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legal scholars to the trajectory of legal education — as opposed to merely 
adding interpretive depth to a scholar’s ideas on a field of law — should be 
advanced. The trajectory of legal education is made up of much more than the 
sum of its leading ideas on matters of legal theory or legal philosophy. By 
giving priority to the individual intellectual as opposed to their abstract ideas, 
Schlegel was advocating that scholars explore the full context in which the 
intellectual operated. He said: 
The context may be actions or even texts, for the context of any text is not a giv-
en. Indeed, it is always arguable what the context of any text may be. Because 
words have no intrinsic meaning, because there is no lever and no place to 
stand outside of the conventions of a given hermeneutic circle, it is always the 
context that enables the text to have meaning. Without a context any text is, as I 
said at the outset, literally unintelligible.58 
He suggested that the historian should be open to exploring all contexts 
through a process of trial and error because to be satisfied that one particular 
context established a 
factual proposition at least one would have to give evidence of having examined 
other possible sources of illumination, that is unless the assertion works like an 
evidentiary presumption, either by rendering evidence to the contrary irrele-
vant and so conclusively determining the fact or by requiring that opponents 
first produce evidence to counter the assumption before the proponent may be 
asked to defend it.59 
As a result, Schlegel advocated for an approach that is largely biographical 
and, in a review of Nicola Lacey’s A Life of H L A Hart: The Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream,60 suggested that Lacey’s intellectual biography demonstrated the 
redundancy of the intellectual history genre.61 Within an intellectual biog-
raphy, evidence of what a scholar published is placed on an equal footing to 
their lives more generally in explaining their contributions to a body of 
thought and consequently such works comply with Schlegel’s theory on how 
best to unearth the ideas of the past. While I do not wish to adopt Schlegel’s 
 
277; John Henry Schlegel, ‘A Life of H L A Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream — 
Nicola Lacey’ (2006) 24 Law and History Review 679. 
 58 Schlegel, ‘The Ten Thousand Dollar Question’, above n 57, 452. 
 59 Schlegel, ‘Does Duncan Kennedy Wear Briefs or Boxers?’, above n 57, 314. 
 60 Nicola Lacey, A Life of H L A Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
 61 Schlegel, ‘A Life of H L A Hart’, above n 57, 680. 
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position on the redundancy of the intellectual history genre, I do believe that 
to advance a history of legal education a scholar ought to be located in the 
context of a particular law school or research institution and at a particular 
moment in time of the history of legal education. The history should ask: how 
did the scholar’s mediation of pressures marry with current understandings of 
the agendas of universities, government and the legal profession? I will call 
this approach ‘the preferred model’. 
The preferred model, with its focus on studying the endeavours of academ-
ics to understand the ways that law became ‘academic’, complements some 
existing histories of legal education while being incompatible with others. No 
one approach can provide a full understanding of the phenomenon of the 
birth and rise of legal education. The preferred model can stand alongside and 
test claims by rigorous critical institutional studies, such as Robert Stevens’ 
Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s.62 For 
example, it can explore how a range of intellectual agendas contributed — or 
failed to contribute — to the birth and rise of modern legal education that 
Stevens describes. 
The preferred model can also supplement studies that have chronicled 
major events in a law school’s history, focusing largely on matters of govern-
ance, such as John Waugh’s First Principles: The Melbourne Law School  
1857–2007.63 Waugh’s history provides impressions of a range of Melbourne’s 
legal academics but, given the size and range of the work, Waugh was pre-
cluded from studying any one of them in detail. Waugh appreciated both the 
scale and importance of his task, acknowledging at the outset that his attempt 
to cover the whole of the law school’s history meant that he could not provide 
a ‘comprehensive record of people and events’.64 The preferred model can add 
further clarity to such a study by, for example, explaining what scholars really 
meant when they said that they preferred certain models of scholarship and 
teaching. It can penetrate labels such as ‘jurisprudence’, ‘theory’ and ‘practical 
subjects’. It can explore the extent to which the contribution of personalities 
and intellectual agendas really mattered in the creation of one version of legal 
education over another. It can further elucidate the differences between legal 
education in Victoria and New South Wales. Such studies may also explain 
how legal academics responded or adapted to changes in university govern-
ance and whether they ignored or were insulated from such trends. Such 
 
 62 See Stevens, above n 5. 
 63 See Waugh, above n 48. 
 64 Ibid x. 
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works may test broader claims about the level of freedom and independence 
held and exercised by legal academics and the extent to which they created 
and led the model of legal education which then unfolded. The preferred 
model may also complement and draw from sociological studies that describe 
trends in societies and the pathology of institutions such as universities.65 
Studies advanced in accordance with the preferred model will not, howev-
er, assume that such external agendas and changes in university governance 
automatically affected either law schools or legal academics. Instead they will 
explore the roles various factors played. The model reacts strongly against 
studies that, without reason, marginalise scholars in their explanation of the 
discipline.66 The preferred model most forcefully rejects sociological histories 
that draw purely from secondary sources to devise normative theories about 
what legal education was and what it must become. Without wishing to enter 
into the debate about how sociologists in law or in other disciplines should 
study phenomena, it seems obvious that one should not attempt to theorise or 
draw prescriptions about a state of affairs when the most that has been done 
to investigate changes in that phenomena has been to draw from one’s own 
experiences or what has been discussed in university corridors. Perhaps this is 
to exaggerate the undernourished state of exploratory studies of Australian 
legal education based on primary sources. But I would argue that it is only a 
small exaggeration. Impatience and the desire to at least say something about 
Australian legal education has led to the making of some dubious and 
misleading claims which, while doing little to enhance the intellectual core of 
the discipline, do much to harm it. In this I wholeheartedly agree with 
Sugarman and Rubin’s condemnation of such work in the context of histories 
of law and economics: 
Such work fails to produce new evidence or take old arguments further. Fur-
ther, this tradition seems ‘… unaware that many of the simplest facts about cap-
italist development and the emergence of … (new forms of law, ordering and 
organisation) still await research. There is an almost touching positivism in … 
(their) belief that the “facts” can simply be read off from … (one secondary 
 
 65 See, eg, Thornton, ‘Portia Lost in the Groves of Academe’, above n 23; Thornton, ‘The 
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source or another). High theorists … who descend from their eyries for quick 
swoops over the empirical terrain are unlikely to return to their nests with any-
thing more than the musty grain of cliche unless they are willing to settle down 
among the stubble to peck away with the rest of us pigeons.’67 
No matter how mundane, this paper is a call for more pigeons. 
The preferred model also stands at odds with law school histories that 
present as mere aide-mémoires to those who inhabit the law school, rather 
than as contributions to the critical study of law schools and legal education. 
Decorated with photos, these works typically relate personal anecdotes of 
students and scholars, the movement of the law school into new premises, 
details of the law school’s Deans and the occasion of the first woman graduate 
or legal academic.68 It seems that larger soul-searching questions concerning 
why law schools have emerged have rarely been on the agenda and instead the 
works are compiled in the pursuit of far humbler goals. As Ellsworth explains: 
A concept of education emphasizing formal institutions of instruction, as Ber-
nard Bailyn noted nearly twenty years ago, will result in history by educational 
missionaries derived from their particular and professional interests. Studies of 
law schools like Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Notre Dame — to name but sev-
 
 67 David Sugarman and G R Rubin, ‘Introduction — Towards a New History of Law and 
Material Society in England 1750–1914’ in G R Rubin and David Sugarman (eds), Law, 
Economy and Society, 1750–1914: Essays in the History of English Law (Professional Books, 
1984) 1, 120–1, quoting Michael Ignatieff, ‘Theorising the Facts’ (1981) 57 New Society 
237, 237. 
 68 For a similar argument with respect to American law school histories, see Alfred F Konefsky 
and John Henry Schlegel, ‘Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Histories of American Law Schools’ 
(1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 833, 838–41. I will leave it to the reader to decide which of the 
following Australian law school histories fall within this category: Davis, above n 12; Alex 
Castles, Andrew Ligertwood and Peter Kelly (eds), Law on North Terrace: 1883–1983 (Faculty 
of Law, University of Adelaide, 1983); Rosalind F Croucher and Jennifer K Shedden (eds), 
Retro 30: 30 Years of Macquarie Law (Division of Law, Macquarie University, 2005); Ruth 
Campbell, A History of the Melbourne Law School: 1857 to 1973 (Faculty of Law, University of 
Melbourne, 1977); Waugh, above n 48; Peter Balmford, ‘The Foundation of the Monash Law 
School’ (1989) 15 Monash University Law Review 139; Yule and Woodhouse, above n 18; 
Dixon, above n 18; Michael White, Ryan Gawrych and Kay Saunders, TC Beirne School of 
Law: 70th Anniversary, 2006 (T C Beirne School of Law, The University of Queensland, 2006); 
Tom Cain, The Founding of the Queensland University of Technology Law School (Queensland 
University of Technology, 1998); Bavin, above n 11; John Mackinolty and Judy Mackinolty 
(eds), A Century Down Town: Sydney University Law School’s First Hundred Years (Sydney 
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eral — have been essentially parochial. By faithfully recording details and in-
ternal facts, by virtually ignoring the relationships between the law schools and 
the universities, the profession, and society, the end product has been the glori-
fication and justification of particular institutional traditions and practices.69 
The limitations of such studies have been recognised in several places70 and 
some law schools are endeavouring to take a different, more probing, ap-
proach that involves assembling, preserving and examining numerous law 
school records and capturing the experiences of former faculty members and 
students through carefully crafted interviews.71  
My point is that a history of university legal education ought to be the sum 
of something more than nostalgic recollections and the chronicle of facts. 
And they ought to do something more than merely refer to the ‘past’ or 
accounts of the past that draw purely on secondary sources. Resorts to history 
ought to be founded on genuine inquiry as opposed to the desire to use 
history strategically as a platform for other academic arguments.72 What I am 
pursuing are illuminating histories of educational and scholarly philosophies 
and action based on primary sources and written in ‘imaginative microscopic 
fashion’.73 
V  T H E  J U R I S P RU D E N C E  O F  LAW  A N D   
T H E  J U R I S P RU D E N C E  O F  LE G A L  ED U C AT I O N 
As I suggested in the previous Part, there are numerous studies of legal 
thinkers that may feed into and out of studies of the trajectory of legal 
education, but which are not adequate in and of themselves as explanations of 
the trajectory of legal education. Studying a legal scholar’s career to discover 
what it says about the trajectory of legal education requires a different set of 
questions and a different selection process to a study which explains contribu-
tions to a field or seeks new or reclaimed appreciation of a scholar’s work. 
While there is overlap, it is important to guard against slippage between the 
jurisprudence of legal education and the jurisprudence of law. There has been 
 
 69 Roy M Mersky et al, ‘The Proposed Legal Education Library’ (1978) 71 Law Library Journal 
619, 624 (citations omitted). 
 70 See, eg, Konefsky and Schlegel, above n 68; Tilbury, above n 2, 259. 
 71 Waugh’s history of the law school at The University of Melbourne is the first of this kind: see 
Waugh, above n 48. A similar work has been compiled with respect to the law school at 
Monash University: Yule and Woodhouse, above n 18. 
 72 See Bartie, ‘A Full Day’s Work’, above n 10, 67–9. 
 73 Mersky et al, above n 69, 625. 
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a tendency to conflate the two, ignoring the distinction and separate im-
portance of a jurisprudence of legal education. This leads to error 
and misunderstanding. 
The conflation of the jurisprudence of law with the jurisprudence of legal 
education has the potential to shut out many of the questions that should be 
asked about the discipline of law and legal education. It brings with it the risk 
that many of the theories about ‘law’ may be mistaken for theories about 
academic law. For example, it might be thought that because legal scholars 
generally agree that the views and theories of scholar or movement X have 
largely been defeated or superseded by scholar or movement Y, and so 
generally follow in the tradition of Y over X, they therefore know and 
understand the way that scholarship and scholarly ideas move from one 
generation to the next. Even if we restrict ourselves to pure jurisprudence and 
theory in law, the mere ‘doing’ of theory tells us little of why theories have 
come about. To understand why theorist Y — say, Dworkin — prevailed (in 
some senses) over theorist X — say, Hart — we need to ask what it means to 
be ‘superseded’ in academic law, why the ideas of X and Y came to the fore in 
the first place and what it is that legal scholars do with the ideas of their 
contemporaries and predecessors. We might wish to learn about the institu-
tion in which the scholar based their career and how that contributed to their 
status and, conversely, how they contributed to the status of the institution. 
We might also want to ask how the scholar’s perceptions of themselves and 
their aspirations fed into and perhaps were legitimised by the ideas and 
agenda of scholar/movement X or Y. We might also want to consider the 
importance of timing and context to the success of a scholar or their ideas. 
And we might want to ask whether scholars wrote on particular subjects 
addressed to particular audiences to further legal education or to achieve 
some other end. Saying that the ideas of scholar/movement Y are better than 
X and explaining the logic or reasoning for that assessment — as many 
scholars do — adds little to the jurisprudence of legal education. It tells us 
little about whether, how and why scholarly conventions changed the nature 
of legal education — added or subtracted strength and took legal education 
down one path rather than another. Instead what is required is meta-
analysis — we need to treat scholars as separate objects of study and their 
scholarship as a form of ‘alien’ practice. In other words, we must step outside 
the community of practice in order to investigate it. 
The importance of studying legal scholars through the lens of legal educa-
tion begins from the moment one selects a subject to study. One feature of the 
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discipline of law is that — for whatever reason — it is rare for a scholar to be 
remembered or eulogised.74 Lists of great legal scholars — those who are 
known throughout the world for their contribution to the discipline — are 
relatively short. They have generally been males from elite institutions and of a 
particular scholarly persuasion. I know of no studies of an Australian woman 
specialising in tax or contract law at a regional Australian university. Most 
often the subject of study, like the scholar studying them, devoted their careers 
to the history, theory and jurisprudence of law. The scholar is characterised as 
exceptional, most often ‘brilliant’. While there are also histories of scholarly 
‘failures’, this description rarely suggests that the relevant scholar sunk without 
a trace. Usually what is meant is that the scholar has not been recognised to be 
quite as exceptional as the handful of greats that dominate the citation 
charts.75 Even when the purpose of the study is to reclaim or reignite interest 
in a particular scholar, it is unlikely that a wholly unknown or marginalised 
scholar will be selected. 
The questions upon which the selection is based often include: Who has 
influenced legal scholarship and developments in the field? Who has laid 
down or challenged orthodoxy? Who is cited often? And, who has inspired 
my career and work? In the context of attempts to discover more about the 
history of legal education these questions and the answers they yield are 
limiting. Instead, what should be asked in order to learn more about the birth 
and rise of legal education is who was in a position to contribute vitally to the 
birth, expansion or change of identity of legal education on a local, national or 
international scale. This question should identify cohorts of scholars who 
established their careers at particular times (moments of formation and 
expansion); who were based at certain elite law schools whose lead others 
followed or who were based at radical law schools that challenged orthodoxy; 
who were the first members of a culture or gender (women) to join the legal 
academy; or, who held Chairs in Law that were likely to attract prestige. This 
selection too may leave out important figures — perhaps teachers who left a 
 
 74 I thank John Waugh for making this point plain to me. 
 75 Yale law librarian Fred Shapiro has identified in several studies that only a small number of 
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considerable mark on students but received little prominence and few 
trophies — but nonetheless may more accurately embody the scholars who 
contributed to the foundation and expansion of academic legal education. The 
basis of selection avoids the assumption that we already know who played an 
important part in shaping and influencing the academy and legal education. 
David Rabban’s recent monograph, Law’s History: American Legal Thought 
and the Transatlantic Turn to History, devoted to American legal education in 
the late 20th century, shows the benefits of selecting legal scholars through the 
lens of legal education rather than by traditional methods.76 His work both 
shines a spotlight on, and reveals the richness of, a period of legal education 
in America that has largely been ignored, while in contrast much attention has 
been lavished on the American sociologist and realist schools of the 
20th century. His work consists of detailed case studies of twelve American 
legal scholars, some well-known (for example Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
Roscoe Pound) and others less so (Christopher G Tiedeman and Francis 
Wharton), to reveal that historical legal thought dominated American legal 
scholarship from the 1870s until 1950. 
By exploring how each of these scholars ‘understood their own work’ and 
by ‘trying to understand these scholars on their own terms’ Rabban hoped to 
strip away a century of distortions and oversimplifications by twentieth-century 
commentators often more interested in their own political and intellectual 
agendas than in recovering what their predecessors actually thought and 
achieved.77 
He also hoped 
to restore a deservedly prominent place in the history of American legal 
thought to its founding generation of professional legal scholars. More cosmo-
politan, more learned, and more internationally respected than many of the 
people who have misrepresented or neglected them, they should be recognized 
and engaged as part of a rich intellectual tradition.78 
Rabban’s method is of the onerous kind described above, ‘[c]ombining 
transatlantic intellectual history, legal history, the history of legal thought, 
historiography, jurisprudence, constitutional theory, and the history of higher 
 
 76 See David M Rabban, Law’s History: American Legal Thought and the Transatlantic Turn to 
History (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
 77 Ibid 1. 
 78 Ibid. 
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education’.79 By concentrating on some of the founders of American legal 
education and taking them on their own terms Rabban reveals the centrality 
of historical and evolutionary legal thought, particularly that of German 
scholars, to American legal scholarship and dispels many of the misconcep-
tions about this period. Some of the discoveries that he makes about this 
period are startling and demonstrate the dangers of making assumptions 
about who or what is important in legal education. For example, Rabban notes 
that biographers of one of his subjects, Henry Adams, attached little im-
portance to the seven years Adams spent as an academic at Harvard.80 In 
contrast, Rabban argues that this period of time is crucial in any explanation 
of the field of American legal history and that ‘Adams and his students 
virtually created the field and provided a model for subsequent legal histori-
ans in England as well as in their own country’.81 Given the amount of 
attention American legal scholars have received, it is both startling and telling 
that such new and important insights could be revealed by approaching these 
scholars through the lens of legal education; by selecting scholars based on 
their placement in law schools at a particular moment rather than by the way 
their work was subsequently remembered and incorporated into works of 
legal scholarship. 
Duxbury’s study of the Corpus Christi Chair of Jurisprudence, Sir Freder-
ick Pollock, also demonstrates that traditional reasons for studying a thinker 
in law will mean that scholars who have been significant in terms of the 
trajectory of legal education will be left out.82 In the opening to his mono-
graph on Pollock, Duxbury said: 
Initially I was disinclined to accord Pollock much attention: there seemed to be 
a fairly obvious message in the fact that legal historians had not bothered all 
that much with him. Yet the more I encountered Pollock the more he puz-
zled me.83 
By exploring the whole of Pollock’s career and thickly describing his endeav-
our Duxbury came to discover that Pollock was a great pioneering scholar; 
that even though Pollock did not devise a grand jurisprudential theory he 
nonetheless provided an intellectual model of a legal scholar; and that Pollock 
 
 79 Ibid. 
 80 Ibid 153. 
 81 Ibid. 
 82 Neil Duxbury, Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition (Oxford University Press, 
2004). 
 83 Ibid xi. 
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created a template for English legal scholarship — carving out a field of 
orthodox scholarship through his relentless case notes in the Law Quarterly 
Review — that has continued throughout English legal scholarship until the 
present day. Duxbury said: 
Pollock was no mediocrity. He was one of that great late nineteenth-century 
group of legal writers who determined, with very little in the way of indigenous 
precedent, what inquiry into law from an academic perspective should entail. 
As compared with any contemporary English academic lawyer, he was remark-
ably driven, creative, prolific, and bold, his interests strikingly diverse. Within 
the field of law there can be little he did not turn his hand to; outside of it, there 
is an astonishing amount to which he did. … 
We find in Pollock’s writing no compelling conception of legal science. 
Those writings illustrate, none the less, that such science need not be commit-
ted to the idea that law is fundamentally rational, coherent, and amenable to 
thorough systematization. Indeed, Pollock appreciated — as many English ju-
rists have appreciated — that the law will sometimes, and to no obvious disad-
vantage, defy rationality. Neither do we discover within Pollock’s writings the 
affirmation of any particular theory. But we do encounter his commitment to 
reason, his disposition towards nuance, his unwillingness to make grand 
claims, his talent for understated prescription, and an intimate, seemingly 
effortless grasp of legal systems and problems.84 
Duxbury expressed one of the theses of his work as follows: 
Certainly a core argument of this book is that it is often mundane, unremitting 
donkey-work — the successive editions of a treatise, say, or the dripping tap of 
a case note campaign — that can have as deep an impact on the long term de-
velopment of the law as can the insights of any genius.85 
By choosing to study a scholar on the basis of their role in the history of legal 
education, rather than because they have attracted ongoing respect in legal 
theory circles, Duxbury too was able to reveal something new about our 
understanding of the trajectory of academic law. He was also able to suggest 
that an individual legal scholar can contribute fundamentally to the role and 
professional identity of legal scholars. 
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 85 Ibid 326. 
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VI  B A S E  M O T I V E S 
My final argument is that not only is studying a legal scholar through the lens 
of legal education essential to any understanding of the trajectory of academic 
law but that failing to do so may mean that you miss ‘all that matters’86 about 
that legal scholar. For many legal scholars over the past 150 years, the growth 
of legal education was not simply a phenomenon forming part of the context 
of their work but rather was a fundamental preoccupation that drove and 
dictated the form and nature of their work. To ignore this connection is to 
misunderstand their motivations and to misinterpret their contribution. 
A scholarly article, monograph or textbook not only represents the culmi-
nation of study, interest and creative endeavours, it is also forms evidence of 
how the scholar answered such questions as: How should I educate lawyers? 
And, how can I make a case for university legal education, showing it is both 
necessary and worthwhile? As Krygier recently brought to our attention, 
Williams once defined the concept of personal integrity as follows: 
the person in question has, as seriously as possible, tried to think about the 
standards or the fundamental projects which are sustaining him or her. If he 
has done that and if, in the light of the thought he has displayed there, he comes 
out and does say, this is what I do most fundamentally believe in, and this is 
what I am going to do, then that person is displaying integrity, even though you 
do not agree with whatever it is that is sustaining him.87 
I believe that it is fair to expect that within the work (scholarship and broader 
endeavours) of any legal scholar of integrity we will find this link between the 
scholar’s general ideas and their views on legal education. They will think 
about the connection between the work that they do and their role. Their 
work can be viewed, at least in part, as a manifestation of what they believe 
legal education needs and what they believe a legal scholar ought to do, 
particularly as this was a major point of focus for scholars writing at particu-
lar times. If we ignore this link we both misrepresent the scholar and the basis 
on which their integrity rests. 
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A  Founding University Legal Education 
During various periods in the history of university legal education its form, 
content, survival and growth have been central concerns for scholars. There 
are three pivotal periods in the growth of modern-day Australian legal 
education. The first period covers the original establishment of law as a 
university discipline during the founding of Australia’s first universities. 
Although there is some contest concerning the ordering (which largely 
depends on the date you place on the birth of legal education at The Universi-
ty of Sydney), the teaching of law in Australian universities can be traced back 
to the 1850s. While in some places, such as The University of Melbourne, the 
move was encouraged by rules that meant that law graduates were exempt 
from the admission exams of the Victorian Supreme Court,88 law schools in 
Australia generally remained small until after the Second World War. There 
were no more than a handful of full-time academic law staff at each of the 
schools, and in some places lone professors sought to create the curriculum 
largely on their own, coordinating part-time practitioners to do much of the 
teaching. These professors were learned men, with liberal educations and 
qualifications from English universities. While their resources may have been 
meagre, their ambitions were often grand. From their pursuits — their 
teaching, scholarship, organisation and contribution to public life — we can 
detect the first versions of Australian legal theory. During this time we find 
several examples of scholars speaking directly to the issue of university 
legal education.89 
Writing of the equivalent early formative period in England, Stein has 
similarly argued that a scholar from this period, in his case Sir Henry Maine, 
must be understood through the lens of legal education. He explained: 
Maine’s basic ideas about law were closely linked to the particular needs of legal 
education in England in the 1850s, as he perceived them. That was the period 
when Maine was giving the lectures which became the basis of Ancient Law, 
and his perception of what students of law should be taught coloured what he 
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 89 See, eg, W Jethro Brown, ‘The Purpose and Method of a Law School’ (Pt I) (1902) 18 Law 
Quarterly Review 78; W Jethro Brown, ‘The Purpose and Method of a Law School’ (Pt II) 
(1902) 18 Law Quarterly Review 192; W Jethro Brown, ‘Law Schools and the Legal Profession’ 
(1908) 6 Commonwealth Law Review 3. 
2014] Towards a History of Law as an Academic Discipline 475 
included in his lectures. So our first concern is with the state of legal education 
at that time.90 
In another chapter on Maine in the same book, Twining set out a list of the 
types of studies that could be conducted on Maine: 
It could refer to Maine’s views about legal education; the relationship of those 
views to his general ideas; the influence of either or both of these on the subse-
quent development of legal education in England; and Maine’s ideas as a subject 
of study within legal education.91 
These are precisely the kinds of studies that I believe are needed to understand 
this early period of Australian legal education. 
The context of legal education is critical to understanding both a scholar’s 
teaching and their scholarly practices during the founding of legal education. 
Whether, for example, a scholar believed that legal education was best 
supported on the grounds that its methods and subject matter were akin to 
the methods and aims of natural science may have been of crucial importance 
to that scholar, dictating the method, findings and presentation of their 
work.92 Attitudes of the profession — both real and perceived by the legal 
scholar — may also explain why they chose to write and teach in accordance 
with model A rather than model B. Such things might explain the ‘conserva-
tive’ underpinnings of a scholar’s work or else suggest that the scholar was 
taking a real gamble in advancing ideas and approaches for which they would 
most likely be condemned, perhaps in the hope of one day encouraging 
change. As Cosgrove argued in his work on jurisprudence from Blackstone to 
Hart: ‘many of the controversies that have beset legal speculation since the 
time of Sir William Blackstone in the middle of the eighteenth century 
originated in issues of motivation and audience, not just definition and 
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analysis’.93 An explanation of a scholar’s work that does not recognise the 
significance of this context simply will not make sense and will mistake the 
scholar’s role in history. 
B  Founding the Legal Academy 
The second important period in the history of Australian legal education was 
the significant growth in Australian university legal education. In the second 
half of the 20th century universities became the dominant providers of legal 
education.94 While this created an obstacle to practice insofar as it required 
aspiring lawyers to gain entry to a university law school and successfully 
complete three and a half years or more of full-time university study, it also 
liberated the practice of law. Admission to practice no longer depended on the 
ability or willingness of the profession to employ articled clerks and the 
prejudices once associated with such choices. Instead it depended on a 
student’s ability to succeed along the more egalitarian path of university study. 
The creation of new universities, new law schools, lower cut-off scores, and 
Commonwealth funding led to a dramatic increase in the number of student 
places and lawyers and has also meant that many law graduates now seek 
employment outside traditional practice. Law graduates have become a 
distinctive and growing body of the Australian labour force operating in a 
range of different sectors. Not only have these changes brought about a new 
type of university graduate, they have also created a new vocation: the 
professional university law teacher. Since the mid to late 1950s a community 
of full-time legal academics has emerged, supplementing the handful of 
existing full-time teachers and replacing many of the practising lawyers who 
taught at law schools on a part-time basis. They represent the birth of modern 
Australian legal education. 
This second period can be further divided into two parts. First, we have 
the transformation of the original law schools, founded prior to the Second 
World War (Melbourne, Sydney, Adelaide, Tasmania, Western Australia and 
Queensland) from relatively small affairs (a small number of students taught 
by a small group of teachers) to much larger professionalised bodies. This 
provided opportunities for the new professionalised group of law teachers to 
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realise some of the ambitions of their predecessors while adding more of their 
own. Interestingly, in this early period we also find the creation of a Chair of 
Law in a body created as a Research School of Social Sciences, providing yet 
another opportunity to conceptualise the university study of law.95 
The second part of this second period is the creation of new law schools in 
the 1960s and 1970s, fuelling the further expansion of university legal 
education. Five new law schools at relatively new universities were created at 
this time: Monash, UNSW, Macquarie, Queensland Institute of Technology 
(now Queensland University of Technology) and New South Wales Institute 
of Technology (now University of Technology, Sydney). A legal studies school 
was also created at La Trobe. While only presented with 10–20 years of a 
so-called ‘orthodoxy’ in Australian university legal education, many of these 
law schools sought to distinguish their approaches from the older schools. 
Several of the schools were staffed with teachers from the older schools who 
treated their move as a fresh start, a way to break away from some of the 
entrenched practices of the old. The large pool of funds given to several of 
these schools, relative to funding at existing institutions, brought with it 
further opportunities to realise some other ambitions for Australian legal 
education and, in some instances, to ‘outdo’ the existing law schools by 
attracting staff with the offer of more favourable working conditions. Again it 
was a period of change and re-creation bringing with it the necessity to 
develop new legal theories and to think again about what and how to write 
and teach. 
In this second period we find legal scholars writing directly on the issue of 
university legal education. For example, Professor David Derham of 
The University of Melbourne, then of Monash, made Australian legal educa-
tion a central concern of his scholarship.96 Professor Geoffrey Sawer, the first 
Professor of Law in the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian 
National University, published several pieces on legal education and about his 
role as a ‘research-only’ professor in a school of social scientists. In these 
works he explained that he conceptualised his role as being of a narrow 
compass, being subsidiary to, and in servitude of, the social scientists.97 His 
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contribution to the school must be viewed in light of this narrow conception. 
Sawer believed that even when located in a research institute, law ought to 
retain a strong educational focus (in this case, postgraduate) to retain 
relevance.98 The legal academics at Macquarie filled an entire volume of a 
journal with thoughts on legal education, signalling a desire to challenge the 
traditional paradigm of legal education and to motivate other scholars to ask 
more searching questions about their role.99 And at the Faculty of Law of 
UNSW we find similar, though perhaps not as radical, questioning.100 
While the academics in the second wave of Australian law schools no 
doubt had a growing sense of security about the existence and entrenchment 
of university legal education as opposed to mere professional training, they 
also had something to prove. Their reputations depended on attracting bright 
students — not just the spillovers from the sandstone universities — and on 
demonstrating that their ‘new’ approaches to the study of law were worth-
while. They also needed to satisfy the profession that their graduates were 
worth employing. Just how far they departed from the so-called orthodoxy — 
as opposed to merely marketing themselves in this way — is worthy of further 
exploration. Such exploration must involve the study of both the aspiration 
and academic endeavour of the legal academics at these universities and must 
compare it with their contemporaries at the sandstone institutions. It must 
penetrate the labels of ‘new’ and ‘old’ and ‘critical’ and ‘positivist’ to describe 
what was actually done or contemplated by individuals. While the introduc-
tion of small group teaching and the introduction of new subjects may 
provide some indication of change and difference, what these changes really 
meant can only be understood by studying the intellectual agenda of scholars. 
Were they simply trying to create points of difference or did changes fit within 
an academic agenda which was accommodated by and played out within the 
new environment? And where did their inspiration come from, given that 
many came from the older establishments? Again, as with the founders of 
university education, one would expect that the context would be extremely 
important. How did their academic agendas fit within this context? 
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As Laura Kalman’s study of American legal realism shows, one should not 
assume that there is a relationship between scholarly ambition and teaching. 
In her history of a group of American legal realists at Yale, Kalman discovered 
that many of the central ideas of the leading jurists were not translated to the 
curricula and classroom.101 A range of other factors born from the context of 
legal education (funding, personalities, promotions and so on) explained why 
her professors ended up teaching particular subjects in particular ways. This 
contributed to an explanation of why American legal realism did not over-
throw American law school orthodoxy. 
C  Large-Scale University Legal Education 
This brings us to the most recent period, which I will say less about first, 
because it seems too early to write a history of the past 20 or so years, and 
second, because in the current period my argument that a scholar’s endeavour 
is best viewed through the lens of the history of legal education loses some of 
its force. It is a period that consists of the creation of yet more university law 
schools and the further rapid expansion of legal education. It marks the full 
professionalisation of Australian legal education where the existence and 
growth of such education is taken largely for granted. As such, it may have 
also brought with it, at least partially, the severance of the connection between 
scholarly endeavour and serious thought about the form and nature of legal 
education. As university legal education is now largely (rightly or wrongly) 
taken for granted, scholarly endeavour may take on a life of its own and the 
pioneering spirit that marked a large proportion of the 20th century has largely 
vanished. While this has not curbed innovation — with interdisciplinary and 
sociological perspectives increasing in popularity — it is more difficult to 
analyse new initiatives through the lens of what they say about the enterprise 
of legal education. It may be that new scholarship says nothing at all about 
what the authors think about the role that law schools or legal education 
should play. Or perhaps it is the more orthodox scholars, who had previously 
taken their roles for granted, who are now engaging in greater soul-searching 
about what it is they do. Just as the law graduate who does not wish to practise 
law has emerged, so too has the legal academic who conceptualises their role 
as being something other than the education of future legal practitioners or 
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even law graduates.102 Taking the place of the Australian legal scholar for 
granted, works of scholarship speak of a sense of freedom felt by their authors 
rather than a sense of obligation or responsibility to create a particular model 
of legal education. Whether this freedom is helpful or harmful will perhaps 
one day be viewed and analysed through the lens of a history of Australian 
university legal education. 
VII  CO N C LU SI O N  
When the masterful foreign histories of legal education are known to few, 
when local equivalents lack the critical muscle and depth of their overseas 
counterparts, when vague and misleading impressions of history have been 
used strategically to suggest a radical new course for teaching and scholarship, 
where enthusiasm for history in law is lacklustre at best,103 and when scholar-
ship and theory about legal education is treated within the academy as a 
specialised pursuit and shunned by many of its brightest, it is easy to appreci-
ate why convincing others of the need for a certain kind of robust inquiry into 
the history of law as an academic discipline will be difficult. Nonetheless, that 
is what I have tried to do in this article. More should be done to work out 
what Australian legal education is and what it has been before more claims are 
made about what it ought to be. If it ever occurs, the writing of a body of such 
Australian works may further convince others of the importance and role of 
such works. My purpose has been to suggest ways that legal academics can be 
studied through the lens of legal education to benefit both our understanding 
of the trajectory of academic law and university legal education as well as our 
understanding of those scholars. Not only does this open up a large field of 
subjects to study, it also encourages methods of scholarly inquiry that locate 
legal ideas within their context. Far from being an esoteric indulgence, I hope 
to have shown that the history of the scholarly agendas and endeavours of the 
legal academy should be of primary interest and concern to all legal scholars 
of integrity — those who think hard about what and how to write and 
teach — and is important for rational discussion about both law and legal 
education. Effectively responding to and outwitting some of the curious 
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demands presently being made within Australian universities requires 
such integrity. 
